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The Federal Courts in the 21st Century
Deanell Reece Tacha*
Good evening. It is a pleasure to be with you at this lively,
relatively new law school. I want you to know that it is truly an
honor to serve as the inaugural Chapman University School of
Law Jurist in Residence. I share your enthusiasm for the poten-
tial that inherently resides in a new law school. Although you face
all the challenges of a new endeavor, you have the great strength
of a fresh beginning. Most law schools throughout this country
are strengthened by their history and traditions, but they are also
hampered by the same. They find it difficult to break from old
ways of doing things, established teaching methods and the long
ingrained norms of the profession. The Chapman University
School of Law, on the other hand, has begun its own traditions
with a focused eye to the future. A simple look through your
course book, a scan of the faculty profiles, and a quick glance at
your student body are enough to get a strong sense of your com-
mitment to educating for a stronger legal profession in the future.
I applaud you and I thank you for this opportunity to be with you.
I assume that it is because of this eye toward the future that
you have asked me to address tonight the federal courts in the
next century. Over the coming year, almost everyone will be, in
one forum or another, pulling out their crystal balls and making
predictions about just what it will be like in the next century and
indeed in the new millennium. Now, I need to say that I have
noticed two kinds of people in this millennial furor. The one kind
are those that made reservations months ago for Rio or London or
Times Square to ensure they are very much a part of the history-
making change of the millennium-thus, seeing the occasion in
millennial terms. The other kind recognizes that it is but a one-
minute change in the hourglass of time, and that grand efforts to
philosophize, theorize, and predict are no more than speculation
indulging the ongoing curiosity of the human race. I fall in the
first category, and my husband is in the latter. I am in what I call
the "cataclysm class"-that is, those who cannot resist the urge to
feel like the turn of this century is an extraordinary moment in
history in which I am so lucky to participate. My husband, on the
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other hand, is in quite the other category. He refuses to make
reservations anywhere and would prefer to be at home with our
children, worrying whether they are driving appropriately and do-
ing all of the other rather tradition-laden things that have been a
part of our household every New Year's Eve. As I reflect on these
two classes of people, I realize that, in some ways, we both reflect
what it will take to go bravely into the new century. So it is with
the legal profession. This rather stark contrast in the millennial
moods has caused me to reflect somewhat more seriously on how
the legal profession should approach the next century. I have
come to understand that we must see it both as a rare opportu-
nity-an important moment in history-and as a tiny point in an
ever-evolving history and tradition that we must preserve. To see
the turn of the century, for the law and for the courts, exclusively
as a cataclysmic event or exclusively as a nonevent, is a mistake.
Instead, it is, just as in my household, a time to reflect on the im-
portance of both perspectives. For, after all, is that not the heart
and soul of the common law-gradual change that sometimes has
cataclysmic effects? If I were to put my predictions about the fu-
ture of the federal courts into one phrase, it would be that: grad-
ual change, sometimes with cataclysmic effects.
You have asked me to look into a magic mirror of sorts and
consider what the federal courts might be like in the next century:
with what cases they will deal, how they will function, and who
will constitute the judges, lawyers, and litigants. I wish I had that
all-knowing magic mirror that would reflect back to me some
images from the future. I do not have such a valuable object. I
have only law books of the past, a constitutional republic that has
lasted over 200 years, and the bright hopes of new generations of
Americans. That is the future of the federal courts. For as you
look in the Federal Reporters 1st, 2d, and 3d, you see a reflection
of that history and those hopes. It will be no different in the next
century. Although, I daresay, it will not be in books. It will in-
stead be in a far smaller reporting system.
Thus, tonight, instead of trying to look into some magic mir-
ror, I would like to identify what I consider some predictors of the
next century for the federal courts, and talk about how those
predictors may give us a glimpse of the substance of the federal
courts' work in the next century and how we will conduct that
work. Envisioning where the courts will be in the 21st century
necessarily entails looking at the past and the present, and then
gauging the future by examining current demographic trends. I'll
address each in turn.
For my first predictor of the future, I look back. The federal
courts, along with the other two branches of the federal govern-
ment and their counterparts in the several states, have stood the
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test of time as the institutional guardians of our constitutional
system. Little could those men in Philadelphia in 1787 have
known of the challenges that this system of government would
confront and survive. When I reflect upon the dynamics that are
so much a part of the Constitution and our system of government
as it is lived out at the turn of this century, I stand in awe of the
idealism, sheer patriotism, and faith in the people of this nation
that must have pervaded that Constitutional Convention. That
idealism, patriotism, and faith in the people must persist and
guide us-their millennial counterparts. Whether one reads the
notes from the Constitutional Convention, or any of the historical
materials of that day, one is reminded of the robust debate about
forms of government and about protection of freedoms. We can be
no less robust in our own consideration. Thus, as a predictor of
the federal courts in the 21st century, I think we must begin with
"first principles." The Chief Justice recently reminded us, in his
opinion in United States v. Lopez,1 that we base our entire scheme
of government on a set of first principles. They are simple in the
saying and enormously complex in the carrying out. They are
those basic principles upon which this government was founded.
First and foremost, the sovereignty that is not specifically
given to governments resides in the people.2 Those resounding
words that introduce the Constitution, "We the People . . . ," can-
not become the hollow beginnings to a historical document. They
must instead continue to underlie every action that every branch
of government at the federal level and in all the states takes. We
must continue to give them meaning in a society where it would be
so easy to succumb to the rhetoric that individuals make very lit-
tle difference. Individual sovereignty is not just an appealing
phrase; it is the bedrock of our system of government and a
weighty responsibility of the federal courts. It is one of those first
principles that we cannot ignore, and one deserving re-emphasis
in the clamor and bustle of a technological world.
Another first principle that will play a part in the federal
courts is the careful protection of a federalist system 3-a system
where the sovereign states have vibrant, important roles to play
in this republic: a place where the demarcations between state
and federal action are clearer than I think they are today; a place
where we understand that though regionalism may not be a neces-
sity in the modern world, federalism is. Never, in my judgment,
has it been more important for some part of government to be
close to the people. Much of our population feels disenfranchised,
anonymous, and certainly distanced from seats of power. In the
1 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
2 See id. at 552.
3 See id.
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face of these fears and perceptions, it would be exactly the wrong
direction to retreat from the principles of federalism that were so
carefully crafted by the Framers of the Constitution. It is no less
true today than it was 200 years ago that some things are best
done by the federal government and some are best reserved to the
states. I worry that we have lost our collective understanding of
what falls into which category.
The third first principle that will require vigilant attention is
maintaining carefully the boundary lines among legislative, exec-
utive, and judicial powers.4 In those carefully constructed first
three articles of the Constitution lie a strength that no other na-
tion in the world enjoys. By making the conscious choice to reject
a parliamentary form of government, the Founders of this Consti-
tution somehow had the prescience to know that an independent
judiciary was necessary to an ordered government where the indi-
vidual enjoys many of the accoutrements of sovereignty. I do not
here exaggerate the role of the federal courts. Instead, I ask that
each of the branches of government understand and carefully pro-
tect those time-tested limitations on each other's powers. As Con-
gress has moved into more and more complex legislation-setting
policy, it has become very difficult to legislate with precision on
everything that is the subject matter of federal statutes. I think
the same is true in the states. The result is that much is dele-
gated to the executive branch, and the interstices are filled by the
courts. The courts cannot fill those interstices unless there exists
a case or controversy.5 Agencies cannot act within statutes unless
there is some directive.' Ascribing the best motives to executive
agencies, they, along with the courts, inevitably become policy-
makers. Somehow, the next century will require that we take a
hard look at that first principle of the limitations on the powers of
each of the three branches of government.
I add another first principle to this constitutionally based list.
I add an educated citizenry-knowledgeable to undertake their
citizenship responsibilities-to my list of first principles. I cannot
help but think that the men in Philadelphia who crafted this gov-
ernment premised the entire government on what was then, and
is now, a very idealistic belief that the citizenry would be both
equipped to govern themselves and educated to govern themselves
wisely. The anecdotal evidence that Americans are ill-informed,
do not understand the courts or any other branch of government,
4 See id.
5 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) ("Article III of the Constitution
confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual 'cases' and 'controversies.'").
6 See, e.g., 1 KENNETH CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREAsTISE § 3.1 (1994) ("Every agency decision must be anchored in the language of one or
more statutes the agency is charged to implement.").
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and, worst of all, do not care, deeply troubles me. You all know of
current examples-I will not recite them. In an information age,
however, when those same voters will see only snippets and sound
bytes of their government at work, I think we in the courts, and all
of us as citizens, bear a special responsibility to reassert a first
principle that the responsibilities of an educated citizenry are the
responsibilities of each of us. We cannot hope to have respect for
the courts, the rule of law, or government itself, if the people do
not understand it nor participate in it. Thus, undergirding the
constitutional principles is the guiding belief that the people are
their own masters and the government will be only as vigorous as
the level of education, interest, and commitment of the citizenry
allows.
Let's look now at how these principles might impact the fed-
eral courts in the 21st century. The notion of individual sover-
eignty will be tested sorely in a highly populated and evermore
complex society in the 21st century. The effort, for example, to
meet the important needs of law enforcement in a sophisticated
criminal culture, in which technology makes possible a host of in-
vestigative techniques, without trammeling the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of individuals, will result in a challenge of the first
order for the courts. Already, in the war against drugs, guns, ter-
rorists, and other organized criminal activity, the federal courts
struggle mightily with protecting those important interests of be-
ing safe in our homes and also free from unreasonable governmen-
tal intrusions. As you look through the Federal Reporters, you
will see literally thousands of pages of federal judges struggling
with the factual questions that try to draw these important lines
between appropriate government activity and protection of indi-
vidual rights.
In another arena, the glut of information made possible by the
communication and technology age will require the courts to try to
understand the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly protected
in the First Amendment without totally obfuscating the individual
sovereignty that resides in the people of this nation. More infor-
mation means less privacy, which inevitably results in some cir-
cumscription of lawful individual activity. "We the People" is both
a collective and an individual concept. It will no doubt be left to
the courts to try to guard vigilantly that which is reserved individ-
ually to each of us as a sovereign person and those activities which
are collectively within the realm of lawful federal or state govern-
ment activity.
I also predict that the federal courts in the 21st century will
engage in a century-long debate regarding the proper role of states
in a mobile society, in which our economic life knows no state
boundaries. Many scholarly debates have occurred in this century
1999]
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over whether states are an anachronism. I think not. In my judg-
ment, the Founders got it just right. Political subdivisions, in our
case states, form the mainstay of a stable national government.
To the extent that the activities of the national government render
impotent the work of state governments, we will have removed
some of the vibrancy from our system of government. I think,
therefore, that states, the courts, and the federal government will
look increasingly at rational ways to refocus on the role of the
states in a federal system and to draw more clearly the lines be-
tween the reserved powers of the states and enumerated powers of
the federal government.
From the beginning of the administrative state during the
New Deal era, through the rest of this century with an ever-ex-
panding reliance upon the Commerce Clause as a vehicle for fed-
eral action,7 the federal government has moved in unprecedented
ways in areas that were once understood to be within the reserved
powers of the states. Let me give you an example from the crimi-
nal law. Until the past few decades, there were relatively few fed-
eral crimes on the books. As we developed a USA Today and CNN
mentality that let us know instantly the crimes occurring across
the nation, Congress began to make criminal, as a matter of fed-
eral law, many things that prior to that time had been matters of
state law. There are now over 3000 federal crimes, many of which
were added in the last two decades.'
The most distinctive feature of recent crime legislation is that
the new federal crimes duplicate, to a large extent, offenses al-
ready illegal under state and local statutes. Some of that is appro-
priate. I remind you that, even at the time of the republic's
founding, such things as treason on the high seas, piracy, and
crimes against national security were matters of federal criminal
law.' Perhaps large scale trafficking in guns and drugs are their
contemporary analogue. The Constitution, however, very specifi-
cally reserves the police powers, the public health, safety, and wel-
fare, to the states. 10 With the emerging concurrent jurisdiction of
7 See generally 1 DAVIs & PIERCE, supra note 6, §§ 1.4-.7 (tracing the development of
federal agencies).
8 See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal
Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 39, 44 (1996); see also TASK FORCE ON
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON THE FEDERALI-
ZATION OF CRIMINAL LAw 7 n.9 (James A. Strazzella rep., 1998) (stating that "[mWore than
40% of the federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since
1970," and more than a quarter of such enactments have occurred since 1980).
9 See THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison) (articulating his view that the federal
government should handle only such limited classes of crimes where state laws were
impracticable).
lo See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("he powers not delegated to the United States, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."); see
also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating the powers of Congress).
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the federal government, particularly in the area of drug enforce-
ment, the role of the states is little different from the role of the
federal government. Both the federal and state governments have
statutes that allow prosecution of exactly the same defendants for
exactly the same crimes in many cases, inevitably obfuscating the
lines between those powers reserved to the states and those ap-
propriately enumerated as federal powers. It is time to take a
hard look at drawing rather clear lines between what is federal
responsibility and what is state responsibility in law enforcement
and criminal prosecution.
Both philosophically and pragmatically this line drawing is
essential. The federal courts simply cannot adjudicate, nor can
the federal criminal justice system handle, the escalating number
of federal defendants and prisoners. That is the pragmatic prob-
lem. The more important philosophical issue, however, is that lo-
cal law enforcement is often far more knowledgeable, more
efficient, and better equipped to handle local criminal activity.
Low level possession of drugs, petty crimes of all kinds, and even
violence related to children are often far better handled in local
settings by local professionals than when jettisoned to a faraway
sovereign.
We have begun in the latter part of this century to witness a
renewed focus on the role of states. In the Lopez decision, it ap-
pears that there may, in fact, be limits to the reach of the Com-
merce Clause as a threshold for federal activity." Additionally, a
recent series of Supreme Court decisions, including New York v.
United States, 2 Printz v. United States,3 Seminole Tribe of Flor-
ida v. Florida,4 and Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho," shows
renewed attention to the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. Fur-
ther, the vibrancy of state constitutions has become a source of
considerable scholarly interest in the law.'" Many state constitu-
ii See Unites States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (striking down federal
statute making it illegal to possess a firearm in a school zone because it exceeded Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause).
12 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177-88 (1992) (invalidating a provision of
federal statute requiring states to "take title" to low level radioactive waste or regulate
according to Congress' instructions because that provision went outside Congress' enumer-
ated powers and was inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment).
13 Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997) (finding the Brady Act's in-
terim provision commanding local enforcement officers to conduct background checks on
prospective handgun purchasers unconstitutional).
14 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (holding that Eleventh
Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits against States by Indian tribes to
enforce legislation promulgated under the Indian Commerce Clause).
15 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2043 (1997) (holding, in a
highly fractured decision, that an action that was the functional equivalent of a quiet title
action did not come within the Ex Parte Young doctrine and was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment).
16 See, e.g., Nina Morrison, Note, Curing "Constitutional Amnesia". Criminal Proce-
dure Under State Constitutions, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 880 (1998); Neil Coleman McCabe, State
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tions provide protections that are not found within the federal
constitution,17 which was exactly the plan of the Founding Fa-
thers. We should allow it to flourish, and we should encourage the
laboratories of state governments as variations on the theme of
federalism. Even in political rhetoric, we are hearing much about
the vitality of state governments and their experiments that in-
form many public policy issues. No doubt, therefore, the federal
courts in the next century will continue to scrutinize carefully the
relationships among the various reservation clauses in the Consti-
tution, the Bill of Rights, and the enumerated powers of the fed-
eral government.
The offspring of Marbury v. Madison"5 constitute one of the
first principles that will spawn a constant stream of litigation in
the next century, requiring the federal courts to police the bounda-
ries among the three branches of government. Complex society
means complex legislation. Complex legislation means much dele-
gation and much court interpretation. There is evidence today
that the courts are beginning to ask whether we have effectively
carried out our role in the area of agency review. Chevron 9 analy-
sis, which, even to the least knowledgeable attorney, is known as
a moniker for deference to agency interpretation, has governed
the last decade and a half. For all the right reasons, Chevron re-
quires that courts defer to agency interpretation when a statute is
ambiguous, or does not give specific mandates and leaves to
agency discretion the carrying out of the legislative directive.2"
Since the demise of the old nondelegation doctrine2 and the rise of
the deference doctrine, few have questioned how far is too far in
deferring to agency expertise. In the last decade, one sporadically
sees Supreme Court and other federal court decisions that pay
particular attention to the precise statutory language and require
agency constraints that are faithful to that basic statutory lan-
guage.22 Sometimes the courts have proved the maxim that one
judge's certainty is the next judge's ambiguity. Inherent in this
Constitutions and Substantive Criminal Law, 71 TEMp. L. REv. 521 (1998); G. Alan Tarr
and Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Western State Constitutions in the American Constitu-
tional Tradition, 28 N.M. L. REV. 191 (1998).
17 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977).
18 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
19 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
20 See id. at 842-43; see also, e.g., 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 6, § 1.7.
21 See generally 1 DAvis & PEIRCE, supra note 6, § 2.6 (discussing the history of the
nondelegation doctrine).
22 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 334, 339
(1994) (finding municipal solid waste incinerator facility was excluded from hazardous
waste regulations, but ash generated by facility was not); Public Employees Retirement
System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 170-72 (1989) (rejecting agency interpretation of
term in Age Discrimination in Employment Act because the interpretation conflicted with
term's plain meaning).
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renewed attention to agency review lies the question of what is
really a subject of agency expertise and what is simply statutory
language of common understanding. Recently I have been em-
broiled in a collegial battle over two different statutes, one of
which requires defining "grazing"23 and one of which requires de-
fining "coal."24 Both of them, I argue in written opinions, are
terms very common to any elected legislator and, therefore, not
the kind of term Congress intended to leave to agency definition.25
Those cases are simply in the "stay tuned" category, but they pre-
sage a concern that I see woven through many recent cases about
clarifying the breadth of the Chevron doctrine. I think this whole
area of judicial review of agency action will, no doubt, constitute a
lively source of litigation in the next century, as agencies become
more and more specialized on more and more technical topics.
A constraint on the federal courts in this area will be their
sheer capacity to understand and effectively review some of the
issues that come before them. Appropriately, the federal courts
have been courts of generalist judges. I firmly believe they should
remain so. We have rarely, until very recently, even used special
masters or magistrates to try to sort out complex issues. In
agency review, as well as in complex civil litigation, the highly
technical nature of the issues that judges must decide will present
a special challenge to the federal courts. We began to feel these
problems in the latter half of this century, as we confronted the
effects of asbestos,26 the ravages of tobacco, 27 and the pricing
mechanisms in the deregulation of the energy industry. 28 Those
problems will look like very simple fact patterns when compared
with the ever-increasing sophistication of the technology that will
come to us in the 21st century. For example, Judge Thomas
Penfield Jackson, who is hearing the Microsoft antitrust case in
the District of Columbia, has had to learn volumes about com-
puter operating systems and software programming and develop-
ment. That case is just a beginning. Somehow, the federal courts
23 See Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, _ F.3d -, 1999 WL 64802 (10th Cir. Feb. 8,
1999).
24 See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 151 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 1998),
rev'd, _ U.S. -, 191 S. Ct. 1719 (1999).
25 See Public Lands Council, 1999 WL 64802, at *24, 31-33 (Tacha, J., dissenting);
Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 151 F.3d at 1267 (en banc) (Tacha, J., dissenting).
26 See, e.g., Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), affg 83 F.3d 610 (3d
Cir. 1996).
27 See generally Jamey Pregon, Casualties of the War on Tobacco: Can Farmers Sur-
vive the Anti-Tobacco Onslaught?, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 465 (1998) (summarizing the his-
tory of tobacco litigation); Richard A. Daynard & Graham E. Kelder, Jr., The Many Virtues
of Tobacco Litigation, TRiL, Nov. 1998, at 34.
28 See Robert J. Michaels & Arthur S. DeVany, Market-Based Rates for Interstate Gas
Pipelines: The Relevant Market and the Real Market, 16 ENERGY L.J. 299 (1995).
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will have to be equipped to review very complex cases in a mean-
ingful and constitutionally appropriate way.
My final constitutionally based principle is that of an edu-
cated citizenry capable of governing itself. Here, although all of us
have a role to play, I believe that the courts, and judges particu-
larly, have an especially important one. Although I have not been,
and still am not, an advocate of allowing cameras in federal court-
rooms, I am a zealot for judges and lawyers taking on a renewed
role as advocates for the rule of law. In my view, in the last cen-
tury, lawyers, for important and correct reasons, became so preoc-
cupied with the financial imperatives of the profession that, to
some extent, we retreated from the public lives of our communi-
ties. At the turn of this century, and up until World War II, law-
yers dotted school boards, city councils, and civic groups of all
kinds. It is my belief that, since that time, the numbers of lawyers
in active volunteer and elected public service has plummeted. The
profession is simply not as active in the civic life of our communi-
ties, nor in the lives of our young people, as we once were. Judges
share the blame. In the crush of ever-increasing caseloads, and
out of a concern for conflicts of interest or appearances of impro-
priety, we judges have retreated into our courtrooms, and off the
highways and byways of the nation. Who better than the lawyers
and the judges, who are trained in the law, to begin to re-infuse
into the national conscience both an understanding of and a re-
spect for this rule of law and this system of government that has
served us so well? We are the best equipped for this public educa-
tion process. Indeed, many of the Constitution's Framers and first
advocates were themselves lawyers,29 and they made their case for
the Constitution in a public manner, through the publication of
the Federalist Papers. We each must be a millennial Publius.
We need to get back in the schools, back in the Boy Scout and
Girl Scout Troops, at the Boys' Clubs and Girls' Clubs, in the Ro-
tary Clubs-everywhere we can be-articulating the basic princi-
ples that underlie the important guardians of our system. How
many of you have been at cocktail parties or other adult gather-
ings in which someone voiced the popular view, "How can they let
the criminals go?" How many of you articulated the basic princi-
ples that underlie Fourth Amendment protections or Sixth
Amendment protections or the myriad of constitutional protec-
tions that are so important to our freedoms, and yet often entirely
unknown or misunderstood by the general population? Similarly,
in the wake of highly celebrated trials during which commentators
29 Over 30 of the 55 participants at the Constitutional Convention were lawyers. See
Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Why did the Framers Include
It with Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 361, 374 (1992); FORREST McDONALD,
Novus ORDO SECLORUM 220 (1985).
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questioned the jury system, how many of us have been in the civic
clubs and in the classrooms describing why we have a jury system
and what its values are? Our jury system was designed to help
guard individual sovereignty. As a nation, we cannot afford to for-
get the checks and balances built into our system. An educated
citizenry has little to do with individual cases, but everything to
do with whether the courts and the rule of law can persist through
the 21st century. We must see ourselves as civic educators. I say
we have a massive undertaking on our hands. °
Those first principles were a set of heady historical and con-
stitutional predictors. My next set of predictors derives from the
nature of the courts themselves. Courts move at a slow and delib-
erate pace. Cataclysmic change is rare in the third branch of gov-
ernment. Instead, on a case by case, statute by statute, litigant by
litigant basis, the courts have moved the law forward in a gradual,
ever-evolving way. Once in a long while this gradual evolution
results in cataclysmic change. To get from Plessy v. Ferguson31 to
Brown v. Board of Education32 took more than a half a century.
We cannot know today precisely what opinions of the latter 20th
century will form the beginning steps in an inexorable march to
some similar monumental change in our understanding of the
law. I am certain, however, that the deliberative pace of change in
the judicial branch will not alter greatly in the next century. The
work of the courts inevitably follows the work of the other two
branches of government, and continues to play out many years af-
ter the executive or legislative branches have acted. The 21st cen-
tury will be no different. Similarly, the personnel in the executive
and legislative branches changes rather dramatically every four
or eight years. Not so in the courts, for within the judicial branch
of the federal government is a check and balance system of its
own. Due to lifetime appointments and the political forces in the
appointment process, courts are composed of judges appointed by
several administrations and confirmed by several different Senate
majorities. Often, the leadership in the judiciary was appointed
by a President of a different political party than the one currently
occupying the office. Thus, a part of the largely invisible vitality of
the judiciary is the interplay among different kinds of individuals
with different backgrounds who continue to interact in the judicial
branch long after those who put them there have disappeared
from the political scene-in a sense, keeping the leaders of the
recent past in constant, robust conversation with those of the
present.
30 See generally Deanell Reece Tacha, Renewing Our Civic Commitment: Lawyers and
Judges as Painters of the the "Big Picture," 41 U. KN. L. RE . 481 (1993).
31 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
32 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Although this situation is a result of politics, it is also a coun-
terbalance against prevailing political pressures, and one of the
hidden geniuses behind our system of government. The long ten-
ure of most federal judges, particularly as we live longer and
longer, gives a continuity and a balance to the third branch of gov-
ernment that rarely moves far off a gradual centrist approach to
decisionmaking. Another way of saying it is that the judiciary, by
its very nature, is a correction built into the system to calm polit-
ical winds that might otherwise develop into destructive storms.
Some describe the courts as an anchor. De Tocqueville noted that
lawyers in the common law system tend to be a stabilizing force;"3
the judiciary serves a similar function for our government. I see
no evidence that there is likely to be any change in the basic struc-
ture of our judicial branch of government. Thus, we can continue
to expect, just as we have for 200 years, that the federal courts
will, in their plodding, deliberative way, keep on the same path
that was begun with the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of
1789. 34
Courts will continue to change at a very gradual pace, but we
will change. Here I look at the way that we do business. I do not
have to tell you that the caseload in the federal courts, and in
every state court in this nation, is escalating at an almost aston-
ishing rate, without a concomitant rise in the numbers of judges.
The political, and even fiscal, ability of the federal Congress and
the state legislatures will never be able to add judges, courtrooms,
and staff on any formula that is consistent with the growth of the
caseload into the next century. Although there will be a gradual
increase, as public budgets allow, of these emblems of the judicial
branch, the caseload will continue to escalate at an ever-increas-
ing pace, requiring dramatic changes in our methods of operating.
Some attempts have been made in this century to begin to address
this explosion of litigation. In 1938, reforms in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure encouraged open communication of evidence
and early settlement based on better predictability of trials. 5 The
notion of judicial case management began to emerge around
1970.36 The whole explosion in privatized case management, me-
diation, arbitration, and alternative dispute resolution of the lat-
ter part of this century has been a response to delay and heavy
caseloads. Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act in 1990
33 See ALExIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 267-70 (J.P. Mayer ed. &
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row, 1st Perennial Library ed. 1988).
34 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
35 See Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan's Celestial
City, 98 COLuM. L. REV. 1516, 1518 (1998).
36 See id. at 1519.
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in an attempt to address the problems of delay in civil litigation.37
Videotaped depositions began to be used in federal court in 1993.38
Just this last year, my court, the Tenth Circuit, began to ex-
periment with videotaped oral arguments. In a recent law review
article, Professor Paul Carrington of the Duke Law School talks
about "virtual civil litigation," and speculates that there may come
a time when both trial and appellate courts are "virtual court-
rooms," where everyone is electronically connected and very little
is done on a face-to-face, personal basis.39 I have great respect for
Professor Carrington, but I do not think that our justice system
will ever go that far. I know that we will increasingly use technol-
ogy to try to cut delays, speed the caseload, and minimize costs.
After just a few opportunities to be involved in videotaped argu-
ments, I am absolutely certain that the entirely electronic court-
room, where no one actually appears in person, will not be the
prevailing model, even throughout the 21st century. That model
will, of course, have its place. Videotapes will be commonplace.
Faxed and electronically transmitted information, filings, and doc-
uments will be the norm. Good litigation skills will be defined
quite differently in the 21st century than they are today. In place
of the archetypal vigorous advocate before a jury, or analytical
and thoughtful argument in an appellate court, the premium will
be on precise and focused communication, facility with electronic
devices of all kinds, and the use of technology as an advocacy and
analytical tool. I am skeptical, however, that technology can ever
adequately replace face-to-face contact with juries and judges, for
it is in the nature of credibility that we be there at the trial. It is
in the nature of an appellate argument that we converse with each
other. We can do some of that with videotape. My experience
thus far is that videotape is not as informative for the judge, nor
as effective for the advocate, as an oral argument presented per-
sonally. I also worry about the collegial relationships among ap-
pellate judges who are distanced and connected only by three or
nine video hookups. In my opinion, collegiality is also an impor-
tant qualitative factor in our work.
Focusing specifically on appellate courts for a moment, you
are no doubt aware that the Commission on Structural Alterna-
tives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, which was appointed by
Congress a couple of years ago, and chaired by Justice White, re-
37 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)) (requiring each federal district court to
develop and implement a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan for the purposes of
improving case management, reducing litigation costs, and promoting efficiency).
38 See Carrington, supra note 35, at 1521.
39 See generally id. at 1524-37.
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cently submitted its report.4 ° Concerns about the size of the Ninth
Circuit spurred much of this report, but the Commission studied
all of the circuit courts in the nation. The recommendations con-
tained in that report underscore my gradual change theory. The
Commission recommends no specific changes in the geographic
boundaries of circuits,41 thus confirming my predictor that change
in the federal courts will take place gradually. The Commission
does, however, recommend that the circuit courts look at new
ways of handling en banc proceedings and summary disposi-
tions.42 All of the recommendations go to more flexibility and
more capacity in the federal courts of appeals, without losing the
qualitative benefits of collegial courts.
My final set of predictors is much more demographic, much
more obvious, and no less compelling. They relate to who we are
and how we will live in the 21st century. I have said that the
Federal Reporters are filled with the history of the people of this
nation, and if one looks carefully at the stories in those cases, one
sees a mirror image of life on the highways and byways of
America. So we need to look as a predictor at those highways and
byways of America in the 21st century. What will we be like? I
will not bore you with all the statistics, but I will tell you what you
already know. The first is that we will live closer and closer to-
gether. It is estimated that by the year 2025, 59% of the world's
population will live in urban areas compared with 32% in 1955.43
The number of mega-cities, that is, populations exceeding 10 mil-
lion, will increase from one in 1955, to 20 or 30 within the next 15
years." In my part of the country, the number of farms is decreas-
ing at an ever more rapid rate. Thus, we'll rub elbows and shoul-
ders, be in traffic, confront the sanitation problems, and suffer the
effects of a growing world population in ways unknown in the 20th
century. This forecast has implications for immigration, employ-
ment, schools, every aspect of our economy, and how we live
together.
Second, information and communication technology will give
us the increasing ability to do technologically those things that
were unimaginable in this century. That technology will have its
extraordinary positive effects and its debilitating negative effects.
Federal courts will have to be right there with that development of
technology-a challenge we have only begun to face.
40 COMMISSION ON STRucTuRAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,
FINAL REPORT (1998).
41 See id. at 59-62.
42 See id. at 62-64.
43 See World Health Organization, Health Futures: Creating a Healthier Future Now,
FUTURIST, Jan. 1999, at 64.
44 See id.
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The health issues of this population will change enormously.
For example, the World Health Organization expects that tobacco
will kill 10 million per year by the year 2025.11 In industrialized
countries, heart disease, stroke, and cancer will remain the lead-
ing causes of death, although the long-term total deaths from
heart disease and stroke will decline while deaths from some can-
cers, no doubt spurred by carcinogens, will increase. The growing
threat of emerging infectious diseases, such as HIV, AIDS, and
Hepatitis C, likely will continue to escalate because of antibiotic
resistence and changes in human behavior. Technology will dra-
matically affect issues relating to life's beginning and life's end.
Additionally, environmental issues, some of which are known and
many of which are not known, will emerge as critical policymak-
ing issues for the future. The continuing deterioration of the envi-
ronment, along with a lack of adequate water for the world's
population and a lack of renewable energy resources, will increas-
ingly drive foreign policy and public decisionmaking generally.
In each of these demographic facts lie legal dilemmas that
will be foisted upon the federal courts. The boundaries between
ethical choices and scientific decisionmaking will become more
and more blurred with the resulting ambiguities in our under-
standing of that which is right and that which is destructive.
Thus, courts will be thrust into the chasm of those ambiguities to
try to help society make some of its most difficult decisions.
The inescapable demographic fact is that we will be very di-
verse. Now, here in Southern California diversity may be the
norm already, but in most of the nation and, I think it is true, in
many of the power bases of the nation, diversity has not become a
reality. Learning to live and govern together in such a heteroge-
neous society may constitute the greatest challenge of the next
century, and we'll see its reflections in the courts. Just as Brown
v. Board of Education changed the landscape in this century,
there will be decisions in the not so distant future that will have a
similar millennial cataclysmic effect on the way we live out our
national ideals together.
Finally, the days of nations that live their economic lives
within their boundaries are over for good. The 20th century has
taught us that we could not live within our boundaries in carrying
out our relationships with the rest of the world. Instead, we en-
gaged in two world wars, the Korean war, the Vietnam conflict,
and hundreds of unnamed skirmishes in the name of freedom and
national integrity. Freedom and national integrity will be no less
important in the next century, but we will be forced to seek new
45 See Lucien J. Dhooge, Smoke Across the Waters: Tobacco Production and Exporta-
tion as International Human Rights Violations, 22 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 355, 358 (1998).
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ways to relate with each other in an international economic and
social culture, while still preserving the integrity of our national
systems of government. It is clear from current world events that
this will be a challenge indeed. Again, the courts of this nation
will feel the effects. Today, in the onslaught of immigration and
political asylum cases, we are increasingly feeling the reverbera-
tions of unstable economies and governments around the world.
Now let me speculate a bit on what effects these demographic
factors will have on the federal courts. Some are so obvious as to
seem elementary. We will live in a very crowded society. The ef-
fects of crowding alone will have a massive impact on the federal
courts. In a crowded society, crime is more prevalent, particularly
when that society has an ever-increasing gap between the haves
and have nots. Thus, I see no evidence that there will be a tailing
off in the 21st century of attention to law enforcement and the
consequent adjudication of criminal cases. Today, approximately
a quarter of the federal court caseload is devoted to criminal cases
and cases brought by prisoners.4" The proportion of the load of the
federal courts devoted to these cases has increased dramatically
during the last 20 years. That trend shows no sign of abating
significantly.
The effects of crowding are far more expansive than criminal
activity. Individuals will seek to vindicate their rights against the
government and against each other at an ever-increasing rate. In
the last decades of this century, actions are being brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of constitutional rights at an un-
precedented rate.47 In these cases, citizens are alleging that the
government, in a myriad of ways, is trampling upon their individ-
ual sovereignty. They are claiming constitutional rights, some
meritorious and some not, but almost all the result of closer
proximity.
We will also be brought closer together with people very dif-
ferent from ourselves, with the resultant ugly side of discrimina-
tion, harassment, and intolerance. Through federal anti-
discrimination laws, beginning with those famous Reconstruction-
era civil rights acts4s and continuing through the Civil Rights Act
46 See Nature and Number of Civil Suits Filed in the Federal Courts in 1995 (chart),
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 26, 1996, at A5 (reporting 63,550 prisoner petitions out of 248,335 civil
actions filed in federal courts in 1995); see also Daniel J. Juceam, Privatizing Section 1983
Immunity: The Prison Guard's Dilemma After Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100
(1997), 21 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 251, 264 n.85 (1997) (noting that in some U.S. district
courts, up to 34% of the caseload consists of prisoner lawsuits).
47 Indeed, in 1966, the number of prisoner cases filed was only 218, see William Ben-
nett Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal
Courts, 92 HARv. L. REV. 610, 611 (1979) (noting that federal courts did not report this
statistic until 1966), compared with 63,550 in 1995, see supra note 46, a 2910% increase.
48 See The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982, 1987-1989 (1994)); The Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat.
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of 1964 49and the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990,1 Con-
gress has been active in trying to provide redress for acts of dis-
crimination and harassment. No doubt those statutes and others
will continue to be central in the litigation of the federal courts in
the next century as we live and work more and more closely with
people who are evermore different from each other in language,
ethnicity, and personal characteristics.
Perhaps nothing will affect the federal courts more than the
explosion of the technological age and the specialization it spawns.
From patent and trademark to antitrust, and from securities
transactions to tax questions, technology will bring into the court-
room and into appellate records complex factual considerations
that will tax the abilities of the federal courts to continue to make
informed decisions. The use of experts has become commonplace
and will increasingly be a staple of the 21st century courtroom.
Drawing lines between the appropriate and inappropriate use of
experts, and, at the same time, minimizing the costs of litigation,
will be challenges of their own. The Supreme Court's Daubert5'
case, which most recently addressed the gatekeeper function of
the federal courts in qualifying experts, forms just the beginning
of a long and torturous process of attempting to ensure that the
decisionmakers receive adequate information for fair and impar-
tial decisionmaking, without escalating the cost and complexity of
litigation beyond the capacity of litigants, judges, and juries.52
Again, the lawyer of the future will necessarily have a new set of
skills. She will be one who can simplify explanations, diagram
problems, and clarify complex fact situations. For legal education,
this new model of the successful lawyer suggests very new educa-
tional approaches.
There is a bright light in all of this. One of the reasons I love
being a judge, and the reason I hear cited most often by my col-
leagues, is that we never get bored. Well, the 21st century will
present us with such new concepts, facts, and legal situations that
it is quite clear that we will never get bored. I think the federal
140 (1870) (repealed 1894); The Civil Rights Acts of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-1986 (1994)); and The Civil Rights Acts of 1875, ch.
114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875) (declared unconstitutional in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883)).
49 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 5 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
5o Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12189, 12201-12213 (1994)).
51 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
52 The Supreme Court recently held that the gatekeeping function served by the trial
judge under Fed. R. Evid. 702 applies to testimony based on technical and other specialized
knowledge as well as scientific knowledge. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, __ U.S. -,
1999 WL 152455 (Mar. 23, 1999). Thus, trial judges have the discretion to consider one or
more of the Daubert factors, and any other appropriate considerations, in determining the
reliability of expert testimony.
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judiciary is up to the challenge, but it will be a challenge indeed to
keep up with subject matter of litigation.
Similar to technological challenges, the health issues of the
21st century will have a predominant place in litigation in the fed-
eral courts. We have, in this century, been intimately involved
with every development in medical science and research. From
reviewing approval procedures in agencies, to determining disabil-
ities, to valuing the catastrophic effects of new procedures gone
wrong, the federal courts have been thrust into the middle of the
medical and health advances of this century. That trend will only
escalate in the 21st century. The spread of new infectious dis-
eases will raise the specter of the injection of government and gov-
ernment agencies into more and more regulation, sanitation, and
environmental factor cases.
This century, we dealt with all of the CERCLA53 and environ-
mental clean-up issues that were the result of our lack of knowl-
edge about the potent dangers of dumping various hazardous
substances. The environmental challenges of the next century
will make CERCLA cases look easy. The threat of ozone deterio-
ration, climate change, lack of water, loss of species, and rampant
carcinogens will be at the forefront of federal court litigation in
the next century.
Also related to the health issues will be the inevitable human
decisions stemming from advances in technology. Federal courts
in this century were the cauldrons in which the questions of abor-
tion54 and right-to-die boiled.5 In the next century, those will be
but a few of the volumes of new decisions that must be made. Who
gets organ transplants, who will make the decisions with respect
to genetic selection, what rights does the government have in
making choices about drugs, therapies, technologies, and the like
will all have to be decided. The implications of cloning and genetic
engineering are only beginning to infuse our consciousness. Those
decisions will no doubt pervade the lives of the federal courts over
the next century. Within the last year, major national conferences
were held that brought together scientists from the Human Gen-
ome Project and federal and state judges to try to begin to think
about the legal principles that might help us to guide the law and
the courts into this new world of medical and scientific break-
throughs.5 At the end of those conferences, I wish you could have
53 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
54 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
55 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
56 These conferences include: The Human Genome Project: Science, Law, and Social
Change in the Twenty-first Century, held on April 23, 1998, in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
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seen both the excitement and the sheer terror of both the judges
and the scientists as they thought of the implications for humane
society that the decisions in this area will have. Indeed, just as
science threatens to outrun our ethics, it threatens to outrun the
law.
The globalization of the world economy means the 21st cen-
tury will be the century in which the federal courts finally have to
learn international law. As you are no doubt aware, the United
States has not been a signatory to many of the major international
compacts. Even where we were signatories, these international
compacts barely affected the work of the federal courts. Once in a
while, we have seen a forum non conveniens case or an interna-
tional contract. Rarely have we seen the principles of interna-
tional law, and even more rarely have we applied them. In my
view, it is inevitable that just as the Euro has burst upon the Eu-
ropean market, international law will burst upon the world. Com-
panies have become multinational and business is globalizing.
Though I doubt that we will ever transform totally toward a civil
law model, we have gradually done so over this century, moving
more and more towards statutory causes of actions and away from
the common law model. The infusion of international compacts,
treaties, and agreements will no doubt move us even further in
that direction. For example, the Vienna Sales Convention of
1980, 5' which the United States has signed, replaces the Uniform
Commercial Code in many international business transactions.
Whether or not the United States becomes signatory to additional
significant international compacts, there is absolutely no doubt
that regulatory issues, contracts, and technological exchange will
propel even the federal courts of the United States into the world
market of ideas and legal principles.
The Internet is a powerful reminder of the international sig-
nificance of legal principles uniquely national in character. The
Internet knows no national boundaries and renders everyone with
net access a speaker and a publisher. The leafleting of the consti-
tutional era are the web pages of today. The application of the
First Amendment, so sacrosanct in American history, will neces-
sarily impinge upon the people and sovereign powers of nations
far beyond our borders. The values related to respect for national
integrity will be challenged mightily by the worldwide flow of
information.
Finally, to how the federal courts will do this work! One pre-
diction I feel reasonably safe in making is that the first few years
and Courts and the Challenge of Genetic Testing, held on Oct. 21-24, 1998, in Snowbird,
Utah.
57 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr.
11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/18, Annex I, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668.
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of the 21st century, and perhaps the entire century, will be con-
sumed in large measure with trying to promulgate and adopt new
rules for electronic courtrooms, virtual trials, and all of the ramifi-
cations of technology for the operation of the courts. I am also
reasonably certain that, just as the need for big libraries with
books will be gone, so will the need for big courtrooms and court-
houses. But what a treasure civilization will have lost if we allow
ourselves to be captured wholesale by the enticements of a com-
plete transformation to a technological way of doing things. Just
as the rare scrolls of long ago have been so important in informing
us, so will our books and courtrooms be emblems of this century,
of the achievements of civilized society for the future. The courts,
I suspect, as they always have been, will be foot draggers-plod-
dingly, glacially moving into the 21st century in a way that does
not produce many cataclysms, but allows the hours to tick forward
case-by-case, building upon 200 years of history. That is how we
have operated; that is how I predict we will operate. We will, in
some ways, be an appropriate drag on the system as we attempt to
balance our reliance upon the past with the protection of the
dreams of the future.
So who will we be, the judges, the lawyers, and the litigants of
the 21st century? We will be the people that Thomas Jefferson,
Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Abigail Adams, placed their
faith in over 200 years ago. We will be the millennial patriots.
We will need to recognize that the millennium represents two
equally important points in time: the cataclysmic change of a
thousand years and the single tick of a minute. The federal courts
will be there doing both.
I leave you with an important admonition: we in the federal
courts will be able to carry out our historic function only if you will
join with us in a profession-wide effort to reinvigorate our national
understanding of the "first principles" that have preserved the leg-
acy of freedom that has been ours to enjoy in this century. Some
years ago I wrote a poor imitation of a Dr. Seuss poem about the
legal profession. In that poem, after reflecting on the evolution of
his legal career, the wise old senior partner of a prosperous large
law firm flings open the door of his office and regales the young
associate with the admonition that I leave you with tonight to
take us into the 21st century:
You lawyers are the keepers of the dreams of the world
You've watched as repressions and dictators swirled
You know that the freedoms that served you so well
Are the words of the story that you now must tell. 8
58 See Deanell Reece Tacha, The Tale of Widget and P: A Story of the Legal Profession,
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Spring 1993, at 127, 130 (1993).
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